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The Struggle over Land Surveys in 
Northwestern Pennsylvania in 1794
abSTracT: In the midst of the Northwest Indian War, the former surveyor 
John Adlum’s operations as a land agent and his dealings with Cornplanter 
and other Allegany Senecas helped place a large portion of northwestern 
Pennsylvania in the hands of wealthy speculators. This article describes the 
complexity of the postrevolutionary clashes over land between governments, 
settlers, speculators, and Native Americans. It also demonstrates the critical 
role of surveyors in land speculation and settlement.
The unITed STaTeS gaIned independence at a heavy cost. After the war, Alexander Hamilton reckoned that the national government owed its creditors more than fifty million dollars, in addition to 
state governments owing twenty-five million dollars. While these num-
bers certainly distressed American officials, the end of the Revolutionary 
War promised a long-term solution. The 1783 Treaty of Paris granted the 
United States millions of acres of new territory west of the Appalachian 
Mountains and east of the Mississippi River. By selling these lands 
to 
settlers and speculators, state and federal governments could solve their 
financial problems. As long as the lands ended up in the hands of upstand-
ing yeomen with a sense of deference to their betters and loyalty to their 
republic, the sales would have the added benefit of consolidating the fed-
eral government’s rule over the trans-Appalachian west. However, despite 
the Americans’ nominal territorial gains, during the 1780s and early 1790s 
the West lay largely under the control of Native Americans. Before any 
land sales could occur, American governmental officials faced the thorny 
issue of “extinguishing” Indian titles to the land.1
Across the whole of the country’s western edge, a complex assortment 
of government officials, Indians, speculators, and common settlers vied for 
control of frontier lands. Native Americans attempted to hold onto their 
lands for as long as possible in the face of pressure from both American 
elites and commoners. For the Iroquois in particular, the Treaty of Paris 
had come as a shock. Most of the Iroquois supported the British in the 
Revolutionary War. Although the Iroquois led effective campaigns and 
devastated the Patriot backcountry for years, the British abandoned their 
Native American allies, leaving them out of the peace negotiations. The 
Iroquois later learned that Americans had gained the nominal rights to 
control their territory and former trading posts. Two separate strategies 
emerged: while some Iroquois saw placating the Americans with land con-
cessions as necessary for peace, others fought to preserve their territorial 
integrity as an independent buffer state between the Americans and the 
British in Canada. In 1783, the Mohawk leader Joseph Brant pressured 
the British to refuse to give up their posts at Niagara and Oswego. His 
group also aimed to maintain control of as much of western New York and 
northwestern Pennsylvania as possible, along with a corridor of land con-
necting them to the Indians of the Ohio Country. To this end, he helped 
to organize a loose confederacy of Ohio Country and Iroquois Indians 
committed to negotiating land sales as a group. His continued negotia-
tions with the British prevented his presence at the critical Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix in 1784, where the Seneca leader Cornplanter and others nego-
tiated separately from the proposed confederacy, ceding a huge swath of 
1 Alan Taylor, “Land and Liberty on the Post-Revolutionary Frontier,” in Devising Liberty: 
Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford, 
CA, 1995), 81–108. “Extinguishment” became the usual legal phrase for resolving Indian land claims. 
For an example, see Charles F. Hobson, The Great Yazoo Lands Sale: The Case of Fletcher v. Peck 
(Lawrence, KS, 2016), 32.
their western lands, including their claims to most of Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
and a strip of land along the Niagara River.2
Benefiting from such mass extinguishments of Indian titles as the Fort 
Stanwix Treaty, speculators bought huge tracts of land with the intent to 
rent and sell small tracts at a profit. Some, including William Cooper of 
Cooperstown, New York, developed their lands effectively and enriched 
themselves. Others overshot: Robert Morris bought and sold millions of 
acres across the nation but went bankrupt in 1798 when he could not 
unload his remaining properties. Individuals and companies, both foreign 
and domestic, undertook similar grand speculations in Kentucky, Maine, 
Mississippi, western New York, and Ohio, among other frontiers.3
While federal officials and grand speculators insisted that only the 
United States government had the right to extinguish, buy, and sell Native 
American lands, many white commoners disagreed. They intended to 
legally own their own land in the West but often denied that they first 
needed to buy those lands from the government or speculators. While 
some squatters bought titles “illegally” from local Indians, many believed 
that their sweat equity and occupancy of “uninhabited” lands entitled them 
to possess their tracts or at least have the preemption rights to buy them 
from the government before anyone else. These settlers defy easy catego-
rization, ranging from impoverished squatters to men of means. Tenancy 
was commonplace in many regions before and after the revolution, which 
helped motivate squatters to trespass onto lightly defended Indian lands. 
The government could do little to displace these settlers once in the West. 
Squatters hoped to make “improvements” to the lands by building cabins 
and fences and planting crops, with the expectation that they could later 
buy the lands they occupied or sell their improvements to the next wave 
of settlers.4
2 Thomas S. Abler, Cornplanter: Chief Warrior of the Allegany Senecas (Syracuse, NY, 2007), 
39–57; Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution (New York, 2006), 111–17, 154–62. 
 3 Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American 
Republic (New York, 1995); Daniel M. Friedenberg, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Land: The Plunder of 
Early America (Buffalo, NY, 1992), 338–47; Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation 
of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore, 1996); Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great 
Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990); 
Hobson, The Great Yazoo Lands Sale; William Wyckoff, The Developer’s Frontier: The Making of the 
Western New York Landscape (New Haven, CT, 1988); Andrew R. L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: 
Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780–1825 (Kent, OH, 1986), 51–67; Shaw Livermore, Early 
American Land Companies: Their Influence on Corporate Development (1939; repr., Washington, DC, 
2000), 133–214.
4 Blake A. Watson, Buying America from the Indians: Johnson v. McIntosh and the History of 
Native Land Rights (Norman, OK, 2012), 154–55; Reeve Huston, “Land Conflict and Land Policy 
Whether settlers initially squatted on their lands or not, few were 
content to merely acquire enough acres to farm for themselves and their 
immediate families. They engaged in petty speculations with regularity, 
hoping to gain enough land on the early frontier to secure greater profits 
for themselves and their descendants. In some cases, squatters occupied 
thousands of acres. The huge scale of these operations blurred the line 
between squatter and grand speculator.5
Because squatters would not pay for their lands and disrupted land 
sales to wealthier men, the government preferred to deal with well-heeled 
speculators who had ready access to cash. Nevertheless, Reeve Huston has 
noted the “oddly symbiotic relationship” between squatters and the fed-
eral government: while the federal government detested them, squatters 
provoked conflict with local Native Americans. These conflicts led to the 
mobilization of the army and campaigns that further extinguished Indian 
land claims, opening the way for speculators to begin the profitable settle-
ment of the West.6
It is within this context that we should understand the upheaval that 
beset the Pennsylvania backcountry in 1794. In response to newly crafted 
state policies that opened millions of acres to settlement, speculators and 
squatters crowded into the northwestern corner of the state. Farther west, 
the federal government engaged a confederacy of Ohio Indians in the 
Northwest Indian War. While the Americans had an eye toward opening 
the Ohio Country for white settlement, Generals Harmar and St. Clair 
had led disastrous campaigns in 1790 and 1791, prompting President 
Washington to commission “Mad” Anthony Wayne to move into Ohio 
with greater force. Spurred into action by these aggressions, the Seneca 
Indians in northwestern Pennsylvania debated whether or not to go to 
war with the United States in an effort to hold on to the territory linking 
them to the West. Even Cornplanter, who had been a staunch ally of the 
in the United States, 1785–1841,” in The World of the Revolutionary American Republic, ed. Andrew 
Shankman (New York, 2014), 324–45. Tenancy: Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the 
Founders, and the Troubling Ending of the American Revolution (New York, 2007), 15–16, 102; Patrick 
Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York, 2007), 188; 
Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in 
Virginia (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 175–76, 39–41; Thomas J. Humphrey, Land and Liberty: Hudson 
Valley Riots in the Age of Revolution (DeKalb, IL, 2004), 15–16, 118; Gregory A. Stiverson, Poverty in a 
Land of Plenty: Tenancy in Eighteenth-Century Maryland (Baltimore, 1977); Taylor, “Land and Liberty 
on the Post-Revolutionary Frontier,” 87, 108. 
5 Marian Silveus, “McNair Correspondence: Land Problems in Northwestern Pennsylvania,” 
Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 18 (1935): 237–54.
6 Huston, “Land Conflict and Land Policy in the United States, 1785–1841,” 330.
United States after the Revolutionary War, now spoke with British offi-
cials and appeared to have decided on war. Meanwhile, poor whites across 
Pennsylvania’s backcountry (and beyond) began to rally themselves to 
action against government policies that benefited speculators while levying 
federal taxes on households. Before the end of the year, George Washington 
brought an army of twelve thousand men to western Pennsylvania to crush 
this uprising, known as the “Whiskey Rebellion.”7
Amid this crisis, wise speculators relied on backcountry agents to secure 
their fortunes in the West. In Pennsylvania, the Land Office oversaw 
land sales. The key member of the office was the surveyor general, who 
appointed deputy surveyors, sent them warrants to survey lands, and pre-
pared the returns of surveys so that applicants for land could receive their 
patents. Deputy surveyors conducted the surveys on the ground. Because 
of their knowledge of the land, inhabitants, and laws of the backcountry, 
deputy surveyors could render unique services to their speculator patrons.8
John Adlum ranked among the most effective former deputy surveyors 
who took on duties as a backcountry land agent. Born in York, Pennsylvania, 
in 1759, Adlum enlisted for the Patriot cause as a teenager in July 1776. 
After his wounding, capture, and release, he returned home to work in his 
father’s tannery and learned surveying from his uncle. Beginning in 1787, 
he received a series of appointments from the state of Pennsylvania. These 
included his own surveying district, along with assignments to determine 
the boundary between Pennsylvania and New York, survey various strate-
gic sites, including Presque Isle, and study the Schuylkill and Susquehanna 
Rivers for potential canal sites. In 1791, he surveyed three tracts granted 
by Pennsylvania to the Seneca leader Cornplanter, and the following year 
he coproduced a map of Pennsylvania’s roads and waterways. As Adlum 
continued to receive state work in the backcountry, he also scouted land 
for speculators, including William Bingham and Samuel Wallis. By 1793, 
Adlum was so busy as a land agent that he could no longer work for the 
state as a district surveyor. During the summer of 1794, the Holland Land 
7 Speculation: Norman B. Wilkinson, Land Policy and Speculation in Pennsylvania, 1779–1800: A 
Test of the New Democracy (1958; repr., New York, 1979). Land laws: James F. Dinsmore, “Courts and 
Western Pennsylvania Lands: The Origins of the Attack on Pennsylvania’s Courts, 1790–1810” (PhD 
diss., Temple University, 1990). Cornplanter: Alan Taylor, Divided Ground, 285. Unrest: Bouton, 
Taming Democracy.
8 Donna Bingham Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records: A History and Guide for Research 
(Wilmington, DE, 1991), 179–97. Early American surveying: J. Barry Love, The Colonial Surveyor 
in Pennsylvania (1970; repr., Harrisburg, PA, 2000); Sarah S. Hughes, Surveyors and Statesmen: Land 
Measuring in Colonial Virginia (Richmond, VA, 1979). 
9 Donald H. Kent and Merle H. Deardorff, “John Adlum on the Allegheny: Memoirs for the Year 
1794: Part I,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 84 (1960): 265–324, esp. 271–79; Kent 
and Deardorff, “John Adlum on the Allegheny: Memoirs for the Year 1794: Part II,” Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography 84 (1960): 435–80; Howard H. Peckham, ed., Memoirs of the Life of 
John Adlum in the Revolutionary War (Chicago, 1968); John Adlum, A Memoir of the Cultivation of the 
Vine in America, and the Best Mode of Making Wine (1828; repr., Hopewell, NJ, 1971). In his ability to 
negotiate with the Iroquois and his penchant for conducting land speculations on a vast scale, Adlum 
paralleled the activities of the more famous British colonial agents Sir William Johnson and George 
Croghan. See James Thomas Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks: A Biography of Sir William Johnson (1959; 
repr., Boston, 1979); Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1959).
10 Anthony M. Joseph, From Liberty to Liberality: The Transformation of the Pennsylvania Legislature, 
1776–1820 (Lanham, MD, 2012), 82–86; Wilkinson, Land Policy and Speculation in Pennsylvania, 
19–48; Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records, 163–67.
Company and a consortium of several other well-connected speculators 
contracted Adlum to work on commission as their agent. He entered 
northwestern Pennsylvania intent on claiming up to a million acres around 
present-day Meadville, in the midst of land the Senecas wanted to protect. 
This article will focus on the role of the surveyor John Adlum in the sum-
mer of 1794, explaining the context for his activities in the scramble for 
land and examining the aftermath of his actions. Despite the terrible state 
of diplomatic relations between the Senecas and the United States, Adlum 
and the Senecas cooperated to deny lands to squatters and secure them in 
the hands of elite speculators.9
Land in Northwestern Pennsylvania 
Debt motivated both the federal government and state governments to 
look to the West. Following the American Revolution, the Pennsylvania 
government developed a two-pronged approach to paying down its war 
debt of approximately five million dollars. First, the state raised property 
taxes. Second, it targeted debts owed to veterans. Officials set aside two 
tracts of land: the Depreciation Lands immediately north of Pittsburgh 
and the Donation Lands in the northwestern corner of the state. 
Prospective buyers could purchase Depreciation Lands with “depreciation” 
certificates issued by the government in lieu of payment for their military 
service. Veterans enlisting after 1780 received bounties (or “donations”) of 
Donation Lands.10
During the early 1780s, when the state set aside these lands, they 
remained unavailable for settlement (fig. 1). Prior to the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix in 1784, known in Pennsylvania as the “Last Purchase,” the north-
western reaches of the state were Indian territory. The land was remote 
Fig. 1: Pennsylvania’s Donation Lands. W. J. McKnight, A Pioneer Outline History 
of Northwestern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1905). Image available at http://
digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/Object/Show/idno/15391.
from white population centers and fraught with danger for trespassers, forty 
of whom died in Indian attacks in early 1783. Although Pennsylvanian 
negotiators at Fort Stanwix strong-armed a small set of Iroquois leaders 
into the sale of the remainder of the state, most Iroquois resented the 
terms of the deal, and the area remained unsafe for white visitors after 
the treaty’s signing. In January 1786, when James Dickinson attempted to 
survey territory for the Donation Lands south of the Erie Triangle near 
Fort LeBoeuf, a number of Iroquois leaders stopped him. The leader of the 
local Allegany Senecas, Cornplanter, and two other Seneca chiefs insisted 
that they had not been adequately paid by Pennsylvania for their territory. 
Therefore they could not guarantee Dickinson’s safety north of Venango 
(modern-day Franklin). This region became the site of Adlum’s operations 
in 1794.11
Beginning in 1790, the Northwest Indian War flared in the Ohio 
Country, further exacerbating frontier tensions in Pennsylvania. While the 
United States government intended to extinguish Indian titles in Ohio, 
two decisive defeats at the hands of Native Americans in 1790 and 1791 
placed further American expansion in jeopardy. Given the reality of hostile 
Indians and the long distances between goods and markets, Pennsylvania’s 
auctions to sell Depreciation Lands failed to attract buyers, and many 
holders of rights to Donation Lands sold their claims to speculators. In 
response, the state dropped land prices from £30 per hundred acres in 
1785 to £20 per hundred acres in 1789. By 1792, still only half of the 
Depreciation Lands had found purchasers.12
Throughout the 1780s, the state struggled to leverage western land 
sales to pay off its debts (fig. 2). However, by the early 1790s, the federal 
government’s decision to absorb state debts solved Pennsylvania’s finan-
cial problems. As part of Alexander Hamilton’s plan, the state received $6 
million in federal securities and drew 6 percent interest on these stocks, 
enough to eliminate all of the state’s debts (fig. 3). In 1789, Pennsylvania 
stopped taxing its citizens.13 
11 Daniel K. Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America (Philadelphia, 
2013), 208–14; Samuel Hazard et al., eds., Pennsylvania Archives (Harrisburg, PA, and Philadelphia, 
1838–1935), 1st ser., 10:740–41.
12 For Pennsylvania currency, one pound equaled $2.67, and a shilling equaled 13 cents. Thomas 
Henry, “Depreciation Lands—Pennsylvania Population Company,” in Joseph H. Bausman, History of 
Beaver County, Pennsylvania: And Its Centennial Celebration, 2 vols. (New York, 1904), 2:12–29. On 
land sales, see also Wilkinson, Land Policy and Speculation in Pennsylvania, 19–48. On the Northwest 
Indian War, see Colin G. Calloway, The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First 
American Army (Oxford, UK, 2015).
13 E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776–1790 
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1961), 331–33.
Once the state’s finances were secure, its legislators turned their atten-
tion toward economic development. As part of this vision, government 
officials and prominent Philadelphia businessmen formed the Society 
for Promoting Improvements in Roads and Inland Navigation, electing 
Robert Morris as president. Members imagined a road and canal network 
that would weave throughout the state, linking Philadelphia with a thriv-
ing agricultural hinterland and creating a commercial power in the process. 
To this end, in March 1792 the state purchased the Erie Triangle from 
the United States, making it possible that an all-Pennsylvania route could 
connect Philadelphia to the nation’s West.14
That April, the legislature passed a law to regulate land sales to the 
public. Recognizing that speculators and settlers had already picked over 
the best lands in much of the state, the law drastically lowered the price 
of most of the state’s land to two pounds, ten shillings per hundred acres. 
In the Last Purchase, the legislature set prices for the remote lands east of 
the Allegheny River and Conewango Creek at five pounds per hundred 
14 Carl B. Lechner, “The Erie Triangle: The Final Link Between Philadelphia and the Great 
Lakes,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 116 (1992): 59–85; Harry M. Tinkcom, 
“Presque Isle and Pennsylvania Politics, 1794,” Pennsylvania History 16 (1949): 97. Robert Morris 
became one of Pennsylvania’s first two United States senators in 1789.
Fig. 2: Pennsylvania’s land purchases. Image accessed at https://commons.wiki
media.org/wiki/File:Pennsylvania_land_purchases.png.
Fig. 3: Inset from the 1791 map of Pennsylvania made by John Adlum and John 
Wallis, including all of the area priced at seven pounds, 10 shillings per hundred 
acres according to the 1792 land law. John Adlum and John Wallis, “A map exhib-
iting a general view of the roads and inland navigation of Pennsylvania, and part 
of the adjacent states: Respectfully inscribed to Thomas Mifflin, governor, and the 
General Assembly of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” (Philadelphia, 1791). 
Image accessed at http://maps.bpl.org/id/14507. Map reproduction courtesy of 
the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center at the Boston Public Library.
acres. The assembly priced the more desirable lands north and west of 
the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers and Conewango Creek at seven pounds, 
ten shillings per hundred acres. At these prices, legislators and speculators 
alike could foresee a dense population of settlers covering Pennsylvania’s 
newly opened frontier.15
At first blush, the 1792 land law appeared to favor common settlers 
over speculators. The law established a four hundred–acre limit for pur-
chasers and banned anyone but the state’s deputy surveyors from surveying 
in the region. Aimed at preventing land agents from surveying vast tracts 
of land for single purchasers, these measures would theoretically preclude 
large-scale speculation. Also, while the state normally expected the pur-
chase of a warrant and a survey before settlement, the law recognized the 
longstanding tradition of squatting in the province by allowing squatters 
to clear and cultivate their property prior to purchasing a warrant for their 
lands. In addition, the law demanded actual settlement: within two years, 
any purchaser needed to clear, fence, and cultivate at least two acres out 
of every hundred acres purchased. The buyer also had to live on the prop-
erty afterward for five years or else forfeit the purchase. Like the survey-
ing requirements, this provision would make it difficult for speculators to 
hoard lands while waiting for property prices to rise.16
However, well-crafted loopholes within the law allowed speculators to 
exploit its seemingly populist intent. The law eliminated property taxes 
on the land for ten years, allowing speculators breathing room to sell their 
purchases without drowning in taxes on hundreds of thousands of acres. 
Most importantly, the legislature allowed purchasers to either settle the 
land “or cause the same to be cultivated,” opening the way for purchasers 
to rent their lands or hire companies of men to make improvements over 
a vast territory. Finally, in recognition of the turbulent political situation, 
the law stated:
If any such actual settler, or any grantee in any such original or succeeding 
warrant, shall, by force of arms of the enemies of the United States, be 
prevented from making such actual settlement, or be driven therefrom, and 
15 James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders, eds., The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 
1801, 18 vols. (1879–1915; repr., Harrisburg, PA, 2001), 14:232–39, available online at http://www
.palrb.us/statutesatlarge/17001799/1792/0/act/1624.pdf. 
16 Ibid. On the tradition of “quiet possession” of land through squatting, see Mary M. Schweitzer, 
Custom and Contract: Household, Government, and the Economy in Colonial Pennsylvania (New York, 
1987), 97–101. 
shall persist in his endeavors to make such actual settlement as aforesaid, 
then, in either case, he and his heirs shall be entitled to have and to hold the 
said lands, in the same manner as if the actual settlement had been made 
and continued.17
Given the events of the Northwest Indian War, this prevention pro-
vision became critical, allowing speculators to suspend their attempts at 
actual settlement.
Speculators
Speculators moved quickly to capitalize on the low land prices 
stemming from the 1792 law. In perhaps the most egregious abuse of 
Pennsylvania’s land system, the state’s comptroller, John Nicholson, created 
the Pennsylvania Population Company to acquire most of the 202,000-
acre Erie Triangle. Along with a consortium of four Dutch banking houses 
known as the Holland Land Company, the Population Company would 
become a dominant player in northwestern Pennsylvania’s land market. 
Initially, Nicholson and the other members of the Population Company 
studiously gathered political and financial contacts while incorporating. 
Nicholson arranged to purchase the Erie Triangle indirectly through the 
common practice of falsely registering different names on 640 land war-
rants for 400 acres apiece, thereby avoiding the legal limit of 400 acres per 
purchaser. The named people yielded their lands to Nicholson and the 
Population Company for a modest payment.18
The names on the warrants included Joseph Nourse and Edmund 
Randolph, the register general and attorney general of the United States; 
John Donaldson, the register general of Pennsylvania, who oversaw 
Nicholson’s activities as comptroller; John Nixon, the president of the Bank 
of North America; and the Republican merchant Charles Pettit. The New 
York senator Aaron Burr sat on the company’s board from 1794 to 1796. 
The agent for the Penn family at Fort Pitt, Tench Francis, acted as the 
17 Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large, 14:232–39.
18 Population Company: Robert D. Arbuckle, “John Nicholson and the Pennsylvania Population 
Company,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 57 (1974): 353–85; R. Nelson Hale, “The 
Pennsylvania Population Company,” Pennsylvania History 16 (1949): 122–30. For another exam-
ple of indirect purchase, see General William Irvine’s acquisition of roughly two thousand acres 
around Brokenstraw Creek in Nicholas B. Wainwright, The Irvine Story (Philadelphia, 1964), 9–10. 
Pennsylvania’s surveyor general at the time, Daniel Brodhead, also purchased land under false names. 
See Henry, “Depreciation Lands,” 2:1230.
company cashier. Out of 2,500 hundred shares in the company, Pennsylva-
nia governor Thomas Mifflin received 400. The Revolutionary War gen-
eral Walter Stewart owned 247 shares. The Holland Land Company 
controlled another 1,000 shares. The wealthy speculators Robert Morris 
and James Wilson took seats as company managers.19
In another wise move, the company enlisted the services of surveyors 
and Land Office staffers. Surveyor General Daniel Brodhead was a friend 
and partner of Nicholson. Various deputy surveyors either worked for the 
company as land agents or owned company shares, including Daniel Leet, 
John Hoge, Ennion Williams, and General William Irvine, who directed 
the Donation Land surveys. Nicholson used other connections in the 
Land Office to influence the clerk Edward Robinson to backdate warrants 
filed in 1793 to May 1, 1792, in order to prevent potential rivals from 
interfering with the company’s purchases. In return, Robinson received 
490 acres. By collecting favors and distributing shares among the politi-
cally and financially connected, the company’s managers sought to ensure 
enough support to prevent their venture from failing due to political pres-
sure or undercapitalization. As a result of its connections, the company 
came to control not only the Erie Triangle but also another three hundred 
thousand acres of land north of Fort Pitt, the majority of which lay in the 
Donation Lands.20
While the 1792 law paid dividends for speculators, the state of 
Pennsylvania failed to benefit as much as legislators had expected. 
Enormous buying activity took place: between 1792 and 1794, the state 
issued warrants for almost ten million acres of land. However, a small 
handful of speculators controlled most of the warrants, and they failed to 
pay in full for their lands. By the spring of 1794, buyers had actually paid 
for less than 750,000 acres. In April, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a 
law to compel payment and address the backlog of applications for land. 
Beginning on June 15, 1794, no more land could be bought in the New 
Purchase or Erie Triangle, and old applications for those lands would be 
void unless paid in full by that time.21
19 Arbuckle, “John Nicholson,” 355–59.
20 Ibid., 355–56; Hale, “Population Company,” 125–27. Hale notes that Hoge voted “not guilty” 
as a state senator in the state’s 1794 impeachment proceedings against Nicholson, who was ultimately 
acquitted for mishandling state funds. 
21 Wilkinson, Land Policy and Speculation in Pennsylvania, 126–35. These numbers are from the 
Pennsylvania Assembly—the governor’s office believed that only four million acres had not been fully 
purchased.
Iroquois Struggles
The land laws of the early 1790s came on the heels of a series of events 
that left the Iroquois distressed and divided. First, the American Revolution 
split the community: while many Oneidas and Tuscaroras chose to sup-
port the Patriots, most of the Iroquois aligned themselves with the British. 
The war’s aftermath split the community again: some Iroquois decided to 
remain on their traditional homelands while negotiating limited land sales 
with the Americans, while others cast their lot with the British in Canada. 
Most of the latter eventually relocated to a reservation along the Grand 
River in a migration spearheaded by the Mohawks, traditionally the east-
ernmost nation of the Iroquois.22
After the war, several Iroquois leaders emerged, backing different sur-
vival strategies for continued independence. The Mohawk war leader 
Joseph Brant concentrated on convincing the Six Nations to withdraw 
to Grand River while keeping communications open with the Indians of 
the Ohio Country. By maintaining control over western New York and 
northwestern Pennsylvania, along with lands in Ohio, Iroquoia would 
exist as a buffer state between the United States and the British Empire. 
Pursuing this strategy would move the main council fire of the Six Nations 
to Canada and risked hostility with the Americans down the road. Brant 
found his primary opposition in Cornplanter and Red Jacket. An Allegany 
Seneca and a war hero of similar stature to Brant, Cornplanter’s people 
lived along the border between northwestern Pennsylvania and western 
New York, a region with easier navigation to Pittsburgh than to Niagara. 
White settlers would soon surround the region, and the Allegany would 
need to trade with them in order to survive. Emphasizing the need for 
peace after the devastation of the Sullivan and Broadhead campaigns in 
Iroquoia, Cornplanter primarily sought to placate the Americans while 
he maneuvered for the security of the Allegany Senecas’ lands. Unlike 
Cornplanter, Red Jacket had a reputation for cowardice during the war, 
but his cunning and talent for negotiation allowed him to emerge as a 
22 Timothy J. Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier (New York, 2008), 170–
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to those lands. William J. Campbell, Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix
(Norman, OK, 2012), 106–8, 134–38, 192–93; Taylor, Divided Ground, 44. 
peacetime leader by the 1790s. He developed a compromise strategy, seek-
ing to maintain Iroquois neutrality between the British and the Americans 
for as long as possible. As with Brant and Cornplanter, Red Jacket’s posi-
tion as a Seneca from the Buffalo Creek community also influenced his 
attitude; his local community was situated along the border between New 
York and Canada, well-positioned as the central location for a buffer 
state.23
At Fort Stanwix in 1784, Brant agreed to conduct preliminary nego-
tiations over territorial boundaries with the state of New York. However, 
the Iroquois had yet to sign a formal peace treaty with the United States 
after the Revolutionary War, and they refused to make permanent deci-
sions about New York’s land claims prior to negotiating peace. Brant left 
soon thereafter to consult with Quebec’s governor, Frederick Haldimand, 
for a grant of land at Grand River. Because Brant was not present for 
later negotiations at Fort Stanwix with Pennsylvania and the United 
States, Cornplanter emerged as a principal negotiator in the treaty that 
established peace. The final terms also erased Iroquois claims to the Ohio 
Country and almost all of northwestern Pennsylvania, whittling away the 
corridor to the western Indians. With his absence, Brant avoided signing 
the peace treaty or the humiliating land cessions. He and a council of the 
Iroquois at Buffalo Creek later disavowed the results of the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix.24
While Brant courted better relations with the British, Cornplanter and 
his people suffered at the hands of their nominal allies, the Americans. At 
Fort Stanwix in 1784, he had negotiated the best deal he could, receiving 
a personal promise for one thousand dollars and two rifles in addition to 
the right to monitor the survey line between Pennsylvania and New York. 
United States officials kept these provisions in documents separate from 
the treaty and avoided fulfilling their promises. More importantly, while 
Cornplanter thought that he had guaranteed permanent hunting rights for 
his people in the ceded land, he discovered in 1785 that these rights only 
applied to the land until whites improved it. With his people disgusted 
over the terms of the treaty, which had netted the Iroquois only five thou-
sand dollars in goods, Cornplanter began to fear for his life. He unsuccess-
23 Taylor, Divided Ground, 10, 111–17, 154–62, 250–87, 313–15; Richter, Trade, Land, Power, 207; 
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63; Richter, Trade, Land, Power, 219–20; Abler, Cornplanter, 61–72; Taylor, Divided Ground, 154–62.
25 Richter, Trade, Land, Power, 210–18.
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Congress asked for Cornplanter to negotiate for peace with the western Indians in 1786.
fully sought relief from Congress in the spring of 1786, pledging support 
to the United States and asking for a new Indian superintendent who 
would guarantee that no white settlers trespassed on their lands. By 1787, 
robberies and murders at the hands of whites in the Pittsburgh region 
forced the Allegany Senecas to abandon trading there and to assent to the 
construction of Fort Franklin on French Creek.25
Later, Brant attempted but failed to prevent the 1789 Treaty of Fort 
Harmar, in which Cornplanter and others reaffirmed the sale of the 
Ohio Country, including the Erie Triangle. Dispossessed Iroquois again 
renounced the results of these treaties, but the federal government ignored 
their complaints. At Fort Harmar, Cornplanter again negotiated with 
Pennsylvania for hunting and fishing rights in the Erie Triangle, along 
with a small reservation of land, only to find after later surveys that the 
“reserved” lands were instead part of New York, to which Pennsylvania 
had no rights. En route to collect payment for this treaty at Pittsburgh, 
where the Senecas received moth-eaten blankets instead of their promised 
goods, whites robbed his people three times. Among the items stolen was a 
title for 640 acres in Ohio, partial payment for Cornplanter’s cooperation. 
After whites murdered more Allegany Senecas on Pine Creek in central 
Pennsylvania, Cornplanter conducted a visit to Philadelphia in 1790 to 
receive justice for his people, but the Pennsylvania government delayed 
him there for six months. He eventually received personal rights to a tract 
of about fifteen hundred acres in northwestern Pennsylvania, along with 
payment of a few hundred dollars. On the way home, Virginia militiamen 
again robbed his party near Pittsburgh.26
Meanwhile, in the West, Indians in the Ohio Valley continued to wage 
war with American armies. As neutral parties, Cornplanter and other 
Seneca chiefs had tried to intercede with the Ohio Indians on behalf of 
the United States in 1791. With words carefully chosen to emphasize their 
own needs, they wrote to George Washington that they would attempt to 
“perswade the Wyandots, and other Western Nations to open their Eyes, 
and look towards the Bed which you have made for us, and to ask of you a 
bed for themselves, and for their Children, that will not slide from under 
them.” As late as 1793, Cornplanter still played a role as conciliator, help-
ing to lead an Iroquois delegation to the Ohio Valley in order to con-
vince western Indians to forge a lasting peace with the Americans. His 
hosts imprisoned his party, and he and others were poisoned. Several died. 
Eventually, the Allegany Senecas returned to their homes in Pennsylvania, 
where increasing white settlement activity rendered their hunting rights 
worthless. In addition, their people soon succumbed to a virulent strain of 
dysentery brought from the West. In the words of the historian Anthony 
F. C. Wallace, this period saw the Iroquois nations’ “declining confidence
in their ability to survive as a people.”27
War between the United States and the Ohio Country Indians esca-
lated, leading to a decisive defeat for Harmar’s American forces in 1790 
followed by St. Clair’s disastrous American campaigns in 1791. Hoping to 
capitalize on the tensions in the West, Brant pushed successfully for the 
British to construct a fort south of Detroit, near present-day Toledo. By 
1794, they built Fort Miami, the location of which—well within the ter-
ritorial claim of the United States—signaled British intentions to support 
Ohio Country Indians and undermine American authority in the West. 
Despite this step, Brant did not join the war, and his continued neutrality 
harmed his status among the Ohio Indians. The British governor of Upper 
Canada, John Simcoe, attempted to take advantage of this situation. He 
reached out to Cornplanter, promising him a pension and giving him gifts 
while encouraging him to join the Ohio Indians’ cause. By the summer, 
feeling isolated and betrayed, the Allegany Senecas seriously considered 
going to war with the United States. If this occurred, it would seriously 
threaten speculators’ plans.28
John Adlum’s Surveys
By the summer of 1794, the legislature canceled land sales throughout 
most of the state, but land in the thinly settled Last Purchase remained 
available. Those who arrived first on the scene would get the best lands, 
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but many whites feared to enter the region. In mid-May 1794, Andrew 
Ellicott attempted to survey in the Erie Triangle for the state but had to 
withdraw to Fort LeBoeuf. In response, Governor Mifflin authorized a 
force of one thousand militiamen to protect Ellicott’s operations. President 
Washington vetoed this action, knowing that any further antagonizing of 
the Senecas could lead to war, which would threaten Wayne’s campaign in 
the Ohio Country.29
By the middle of June, surveying across much of the north of the state 
halted in response to western Indians crossing the Allegheny River into 
central Pennsylvania. Reports about Seneca intentions presented a con-
fused picture. Local merchant Daniel Ransom believed that Cornplanter 
had “been bought by the British” and was stockpiling weapons on his 
land in anticipation of a joint invasion of French Creek. In contrast, for 
John Lytle, who had accompanied government surveys south of the Erie 
Triangle, “the Cornplanter acted artfully, in order to obtain presents, but 
honestly, for he communicated every thing to the commanding officer at 
Fort Franklin, even a private letter from Joseph Brant.”30
It was in the midst of these failed surveys that the former Pennsylvania 
deputy surveyor John Adlum arrived in western Pennsylvania with the 
intention of doing business on a large scale for Pennsylvania state senator 
William Bingham, Supreme Court justice James Wilson, and the Holland 
Land Company. In 1793, Wilson and the Holland Land Company’s agent 
Theophilus Cazenove concocted a scheme to arrange for the warranting 
of one million acres in northwestern Pennsylvania through the purchase 
of depreciation certificates, mirroring the Population Company’s grab for 
the Erie Triangle. In return for capital, Wilson would transfer half of these 
acres to the Holland Land Company, which could not purchase depreca-
tion certificates because of its foreign status. This was a clever plan, but 
powerful and connected financial operators like James Wilson could not 
execute land speculations on their own. Based in the East, these men could 
only oversee one end of the transaction with the new government. They 
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had to trust others in the West to conduct their purchases on the ground, 
scouting out and seizing the best lands before other great or petty specula-
tors could fall upon them.31
Surveyors often acted as the agents for land speculations. In some cases, 
men who worked for the state as deputy surveyors speculated on the side 
and still retained their government commissions. Forced to resign his dep-
uty surveyorship to concentrate on what early Americans referred to as 
“land jobbing,” by 1793 Adlum had surveyed more than six hundred thou-
sand acres for William Bingham in the Last Purchase in north-central 
Pennsylvania, in addition to working with the speculator Samuel Wallis. 
His deal with Bingham guaranteed Adlum a yearly expense account, one 
third of the profits from all land sales, and a percentage of the unsold land 
remaining after five years. In the summer of 1794, negotiations ensued 
between Adlum, Wallis, Bingham, and Governor Mifflin about how best 
to exploit the rich bottomlands of the French Creek region that Adlum 
had scouted out years before. Bingham came to an agreement with Wilson 
and Cazenove to jointly employ Adlum. His previous time as a deputy sur-
veyor would make it easy for the surveyor general’s office to rubber-stamp 
any surveys he conducted, despite laws forbidding surveys not conducted 
by deputy surveyors.32
From the beginning of his surveying expedition to French Creek 
in 1794, Adlum struggled to buy himself enough time to complete his 
work. On May 30, Indians attacked some nearby settlers, killing a hand-
ful of whites. This caused a panic in the area, as the whites feared that 
the Northwest Indian War would come to the Pittsburgh region. Lacking 
longstanding connections with local Senecas and uncertain of their own 
abilities to defend themselves until Wayne’s army could bail them out, the 
area’s squatters fled. They could not match Adlum’s resources or dogged-
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ness, and their unwillingness to stay in the Allegheny Valley during the 
summer gave him a great opportunity. He had heard similar rumors the 
previous summer and believed that rival speculators initiated them to drive 
him out of the area. Nevertheless, he struggled to retain the fifty men he 
had hired for the expedition. The men mutinied three times, and some 
sued him when he refused to release them from their contracts.33
The area that Adlum’s backers wanted to claim lay in the midst of 
the highly valued Seneca lands that maintained a corridor between the 
Iroquois and the Ohio Country. After years of experience in the trans-
Appalachian backcountry, Adlum could relate to the Seneca Indians, 
which set him apart from his competitors and made him particularly use-
ful to his speculator patrons. Over the previous decade, Adlum had served 
the state on four expeditions to northwestern Pennsylvania, scouting for 
potential roadways and canals and sometimes employing local Indians. 
Several of these surveying expeditions delineated the state’s boundar-
ies, which affected Seneca land claims. He also surveyed Cornplanter’s 
personal tracts. On these missions, Adlum developed his knowledge of 
the region’s lands along with a mutual respect for Seneca leaders, espe-
cially Cornplanter. Most surveyors never experienced the special access to 
friendly Indians that Adlum gained by serving on Pennsylvania’s commis-
sions for internal improvements. Other surveyors who worked alongside 
him made little effort to cultivate long-term relationships with the Senecas. 
Only Adlum put his good standing to use later on as a land agent.34
To succeed in these ventures, Adlum needed to gain safe passage from 
the Senecas. If he could not do so immediately, his opportunity would be 
lost, and rivals would seize his claims. Four decades later, he wrote in his 
memoir: 
I had no doubt on my mind but that General Wayne would defeat the 
Western indians, and that peace would immediately follow, and that soon 
after the whole Country would be overrun by those peddling Speculators, 
and be employed in what they called improvements, and the next season 
the whole territory would swarm with such characters and [they] would 
drive off all who had paid honestly for their lands.35
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Adlum felt contempt for these “peddling Speculators” who sought to 
“seize the land by what they called improvements, and to prevent those 
who had bought and paid the State for it, from surveying the lands.” As for 
the improvements, he wrote that they “were made by girdling a few trees, 
and driving four forked sticks in the ground, and laying two poles across 
in front and rear of the forks and cover[ing] them with bark—by this they 
expected to hold four hundred acres of land, and two persons would make 
upwards of a dozen of them in a day.”36 Squatters would certainly have 
described their activities with different words, emphasizing their willing-
ness to work clearing lands with their own hands. They believed that the 
work of transforming woodlands into farms entitled them to the land. 
Squatters argued that their sweat equity and personal knowledge of the 
ground created a more legitimate claim to frontier lands than the bits of 
paper that coastal elites passed around, much of which amounted to little 
more than a shell game for massively indebted, but well-connected, spec-
ulators. Squatters certainly could not compete with grand speculators like 
those employing Adlum and usually could not pay in cash even for small 
plots. Settling land without a warrant and building improvements upon 
it offered an opportunity for men without capital to make something of 
themselves, and Adlum intended to prevent them from doing so.37
Entering what amounted to a war zone, Adlum came equipped with a 
letter of recommendation to the commander of Fort Franklin provided by 
the speculator Thomas Willing. As the Senecas debated whether to stay 
neutral, join the Ohio Indians, or withdraw to Canada, Adlum also sought 
an audience with them to request permission to survey. He established 
his credentials at the outset of this meeting with the Senecas, bringing 
invitations for negotiations from United States Secretary of War Henry 
Knox and Pennsylvania’s Governor Mifflin. By pairing his request to sur-
vey with his official documents as a peace envoy, Adlum presented his 
business interests as government sponsored. Beyond this, Adlum worked 
for the Holland Land Company, which had conducted a purchase with 
Robert Morris for much of western New York, where most of the Seneca 
nation lived. To make good on the purchase, Morris would have to pay the 
Senecas for their land rights. Adlum’s status as an employee of the Holland 
Land Company therefore placed the Senecas in a delicate position with 
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. 
regard to future, potentially remunerative land deals. Mistreating the com-
pany’s land agent in 1794 could complicate matters later.38
Adlum knew enough about Iroquois culture to conduct himself with 
decorum. His initial encounter with them could have gone very badly; 
in a crowded meeting, the belligerent prowar faction interrupted him as 
soon as the translators had delivered the first paragraph of his address. 
As he later recalled, “The young Indians on the beam above, saluted me 
with an univer[sal] roar, vulgarly called farting.” Unable to continue with-
out interruption, Adlum kept his head and gave the young men a gift of 
gunpowder. After that, elders shamed the young men into leaving, allow-
ing Adlum’s negotiations to continue.39
The Senecas admired bravery, which Adlum demonstrated by refusing 
to flinch at ceremonies in which warriors fired guns toward him at close 
range or used tomahawks to chop the air above his head. As he partic-
ipated in the Allegany Senecas’ war debates, he tailored his message to 
specific constituencies, based on his prior experiences. When addressing 
the Seneca women, he emphasized the threat of destruction to their towns 
and agriculture, for which female Iroquois had responsibility. When he 
described American victories over outnumbered Indian forces in order to 
dissuade them from war, he tactfully avoided mentioning battles such as 
Oriskany and Newtown, in which Senecas had suffered heavy losses, in 
order to avoid insulting their prowess.40
Like many white people in the backcountry, Adlum also knew that 
the Iroquois held dreams in high regard, believing that they should obey 
visions conveyed in them. In one example, the local Senecas told Adlum 
that they had dreamt that he had given them his provisions, including 
whiskey and hogs. Initially, Adlum tried to deny these requests, saying 
that he too had dreamt, and that the famous chief Guyasuta did not want 
him to distribute these items to just anyone. This plan backfired when the 
Senecas saw Adlum’s dream as a bad omen. Ultimately, Adlum changed 
course, pretending to dream that he would throw a feast for all of the 
Allegany Senecas, with the idea that he could gather intelligence by count-
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ing all of the warriors at the council. Recounting these stories of dream 
manipulation in his later memoir, he boasted about how a clever white 
man could use Indians’ own culture to outwit them.41
Adlum benefited not only from past relationships with his Seneca 
friends but also from their mutual enemies: squatters. Acting on their own 
initiative, the backcountry’s common settlers had terrorized Cornplanter 
and his people, using violence and intimidation to make it virtually impos-
sible for them to trade with Pittsburgh or travel safely through the region. 
By means of hasty improvements, these petty speculators hoped to con-
vince the authorities of their claims to small plots of land under the 1792 
land law and protect those claims against men like Adlum.42
While “peddling speculators” clearly made for poor and unpredict-
able neighbors, the Iroquois had recognized that grand speculators could 
make good neighbors beginning in the colonial era, when the Mohawks 
struck land deals with Sir William Johnson. In the postrevolutionary era, 
the Mohawks focused on securing a British imperial guarantee of their 
lands along the Grand River, but this option held little attraction for 
the Allegany Senecas, who did not desire to abandon their homes. They 
wanted to work with President Washington and local officials, but they 
realized that American political authorities might be powerless or unwill-
ing to prevent squatters from staking claim to the region. Powerful and 
legally adept speculators like the Population Company and the Holland 
Land Company could perhaps become good neighbors who would slow 
down the flood of squatters onto Seneca lands.43
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As a result, while they debated, the Allegany Senecas granted Adlum 
sixty days of freedom to survey the area below a line running between 
the present-day site of Meadville on French Creek and the mouth of 
the Conewango Creek. North of this line, a wedge of land could keep 
Iroquoia in communication with the Ohio Country. Despite their restric-
tions, Adlum could still survey several hundred thousand acres. After 
the sixty days, near the end of September 1794, Cornplanter demanded 
that Adlum cease working. To signal that his people would soon go to 
war with the Americans, he granted Adlum a gift of moccasins, saying 
that he could use them in battle against the Senecas when the time came 
for them to strike. With this gift in mind, Adlum left his final meeting 
with Cornplanter convinced that the Senecas would join the war effort 
and attack the Pennsylvania frontier in late September or early October. 
Fig. 4: Map of Holland Company Lands in Power’s District 2, 1799. The Holland 
Land Company purchased this land from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
John Adlum acted on behalf of several speculators, including the Holland 
Land Company, during the summer of 1794. State University of New York at 
Fredonia Archives and Special Collections; Municipal Archives of Amsterdam; 
Nederlandse Document Reproductie, B. V., http://nyheritage.nnyln.net/cdm
/singleitem/collection/XFM001/id/71/rec/163.
However, news of the American victory at Fallen Timbers in late August 
arrived soon thereafter. The Senecas reconsidered and maintained peace 
with their neighbors.44
Through luck, skill, and connections, Adlum had managed to act 
when his competitors panicked. Nevertheless, the success of his mission 
depended entirely on Seneca toleration of his presence near the Erie 
Triangle. That they did tolerate his surveys in the midst of their delib-
erations on war should be surprising. It could suggest indecision or gen-
uine friendliness toward Adlum, but it can also be seen as an attempt to 
hedge against the future. The Senecas refused to allow Adlum to operate 
in the northern reaches of French Creek in order to keep a corridor open 
to the West. Banning Adlum from surveying the southern portion of this 
area would not have long prevented squatters and speculators from mak-
ing their way back to the region. On the other hand, befriending him 
cemented relationships with potentially valuable neighbors, regardless of 
whether the Allegany Senecas embraced peace or war.
The Aftermath of the Crisis
In the aftermath of the crisis of 1794, the federal government secured 
peace by conducting the Treaty of Canandaigua with the Six Nations in 
November 1794 and the Treaty of Greenville with the Ohio Indians in 
August 1795. These treaties permanently severed the territorial connec-
tion between the Iroquois and the Ohio Indians. Frontiersmen’s fears of 
Indians abated, replaced instead by the fear of an aggressive central gov-
ernment. Washington’s decision to mobilize a large army to put down the 
Whiskey Rebellion in the fall of 1794 signaled the power of the American 
administration to all of the frontier’s inhabitants. By 1795, as the tur-
moil in the region subsided, settlers began trickling into northwestern 
Pennsylvania once again.45
While land companies had snapped up much of the best land in the 
region, the law had stated that the claimed ground had to be settled and 
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improved within two years, unless interrupted by Indian attack. Hundreds 
of settlers began to squat on claimed lands, believing that the land com-
panies would forfeit the rights to the undeveloped lands they purchased 
in 1792 and 1793. However, the state board of property began issuing 
“prevention certificates” to the land companies, allowing them to maintain 
control over their acreage because the Northwest Indian War had pre-
vented them from settling it. Pennsylvania’s courts ruled that the compa-
nies had until December 22, 1797, to settle their lands. In a further blow to 
squatters, the court also ruled that settlers could not legally possess unde-
veloped lands without a new warrant from the state. Any such squatting 
would amount to a prevention of settlement, similar to an Indian attack.46
In 1799, Republicans came to power in Pennsylvania, casting doubt 
on the legality of the prevention certificates. This political reversal led 
to more squatters taking their chances on entering the region. The New 
England surveyor who acted as the Population Company’s agent in the 
late 1790s and early 1800s, Judah Colt, described the abilities of squatters 
to disrupt grand speculations. In the summer of 1797, he wrote, “It was 
more than once mobs of men from 20 to 30 would assemble for the pur-
pose of destroying houses and for other mischief.” By tearing down the 
improvements that the company’s workers erected, these settlers hoped 
to establish their own improvement claims on the land that the company 
had surveyed and purchased. Colt spent much of his time indicting rioters 
for destroying improvements and ejecting squatters from company lands. 
He also employed one hundred men to frighten off potential squatters, 
and the Population Company encouraged legitimate settlers to build 
improvements along the edges of their property so that they would appear 
to occupy neighboring tracts.47
By 1804, twenty-four separate ejection suits against squatters passed 
before the federal circuit court in Philadelphia. Eventually, the Supreme 
Court of the United States confirmed the land companies’ rights against 
squatters. John Marshall’s decision in Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass (1805) 
46 Dinsmore, “Courts and Western Pennsylvania Lands,” 96–124. The Holland and Population 
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tled lands, see McClintock, “Title Difficulties of the Holland Land Company in Northwestern 
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stated that land grantees who “persisted in . . . endeavors to make . . . set-
tlement and residence” were “excused from making . . . actual settlement” 
if Indian hostilities drove them off the land. Despite this ruling, which 
should have quashed squatters’ rights to the lands, the ongoing legal bat-
tles and physical disputes drained the speculators’ resources. For example, 
the Holland Land Company felt compelled to offer tracts of one hundred 
acres for free if the settlers would stay on the land and improve it, enabling 
the company to claim a four hundred–acre tract. One family of three 
resourceful brothers, the McNairs, trespassed upon and claimed 240 tracts 
of the Population Company’s lands, amounting to nearly 100,000 acres. 
Due to the McNairs’ penchant for destroying company improvements and 
their ability to physically intimidate surveying crews, the company opted 
to employ the family as overseers during the late 1790s rather than con-
tinue to battle them. These kinds of struggles with local settlers made it 
difficult to monetize the companies’ claims.48
Despite their early advantages, the land companies ultimately failed 
to make a profit. By 1797, the leader of the Population Company, John 
Nicholson, had overstretched himself financially, forcing him to sell most 
of his shares in the company. In 1798, Nicholson relinquished the presi-
dency of the company, and a series of sheriff ’s sales liquidated more than 
four hundred thousand acres of his property in order to cover his debts. 
Similarly, the Holland Land Company invested significantly in its north-
western Pennsylvania lands but could not sell many of them. In 1810, its 
leaders decided to unload their remaining lands for a loss of approximately 
75 percent on the money they had invested.49
Private speculators also experienced mixed results. Overstretched by 
the debt accrued from various land speculations, Adlum’s patron James 
Wilson landed in jail twice in 1797 for failure to pay his creditors. He fled 
to North Carolina and died the following year. However, through luck 
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and good management, Adlum’s other patron, William Bingham, prof-
ited from selling many of his Pennsylvania lands. His heirs held on to a 
large reserve in the New Purchase near Bradford, and the estate profited 
immensely following the discovery of oil on the property in 1878.50
Norman Wilkinson has argued that allowing speculators to profiteer 
on Pennsylvania’s lands delayed development by scaring off potential set-
tlers, thereby reducing the potential population and long-term revenues 
for the state, but this argument is difficult to assess. It is true that the 
defeat of the Whiskey Rebellion and the Huidekoper’s Lessee ruling made 
it clear that elites would dominate Pennsylvania’s western backcountry. 
However, while northwestern Pennsylvania experienced significant court 
struggles that were likely to frighten away settlers looking to purchase 
land, grand speculators came to control much of the American frontier, 
making Pennsylvania’s frontier situation commonplace. In addition, while 
there were certainly good bottomlands in northwestern Pennsylvania, the 
region as a whole did not present an attractive profile to farmers. In terms 
of its weather and soil profile, northwestern Pennsylvania did not compare 
favorably with neighboring northeastern Ohio or many other regions along 
the Ohio River. Nevertheless, one could speculate that a more settler-
friendly legal regime could have made Pennsylvania’s plans for developing 
a network of canals between Erie and Philadelphia more realistic.51
Cornplanter’s actions during the crisis of 1794 helped squeeze squat-
ters out of northwestern Pennsylvania, ensuring the speculators’ claims. 
In return for his friendship to the state, he received a grant of land from 
Pennsylvania that he maintained until his death, along with a dispensation 
on taxes while he or his heirs lived there. In 1794 and 1797, Cornplanter, 
Red Jacket, and others participated in the Treaties of Canandaigua and 
Big Tree, which sold much of the remaining Iroquois lands in upstate New 
York, leaving a few reservations amounting to 340 square miles. Squatters 
never overran their remaining lands, but the Senecas lost their prior exten-
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sive hunting and fishing rights and could no longer live as they had. In 
1798, the Quaker missionary Halliday Jackson recorded Cornplanter’s dis-
satisfaction with their current situation:
our Forefathers once lived in ease and plenty, but the White People have not 
dealt honestly with us, they have taken away our Lands, and drove us into 
the Wilderness, and now we have but little Land left, we are determined to 
try to learn your ways. . . . we cant [sic] all go to work at Once, because of 
the scarcity of axes and Hoes and the implements necessary to assist us in 
tilling the Ground, and we are poor, we are not able to buy more.
Like other Iroquois leaders of the postrevolutionary period, Cornplanter 
benefited personally from the treaties he conducted, especially through 
gaining personal land grants. He now adapted to the local settlers’ 
market, selling whites alcohol and building a sawmill on his property. By 
1806, when Jackson returned, Cornplanter had lost his influence over 
the Allegany Seneca, prompted by accusations of corruptly mishandling 
both the treaties and his timber business. Most of his former support-
ers moved away to a new village in Coldspring, New York, to follow the 
prophetic teachings of his half-brother, Handsome Lake. The “Good 
Message” included adopting whites’ agricultural practices. In Pennsylvania, 
Cornplanter’s descendants remained on his lands until the construction of 
the Kinzua Dam during the 1960s flooded most of them. For a while, at 
least, Cornplanter had secured a bed that could not slide from underneath 
his people.52
Most of the players involved in the scramble for land in 1794 failed to 
reap much profit from their actions. However, in contrast to the specula-
tors, who took on financial risk, the surveyor John Adlum had taken on a 
physical one, and he received a handsome reward for his role as middleman 
and frontier diplomat. His payment during his lifetime is unknown, but by 
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1851 Adlum’s heirs had received more than $400,000 in cash and securities 
and nearly ninety-five thousand additional acres from the Bingham estate. 
After 1794, Adlum gave up surveying and entered positions of political 
and military leadership, becoming an associate judge and a brigadier gen-
eral of the militia in Lycoming County. He also held various commissions 
in the regular army, including a stint as a captain during the War of 1812. 
Following his military career, he pursued his scientific and agricultural 
interests as a vintner near Georgetown on the Potomac, becoming one of 
the nation’s foremost wine experts.53
Alan Taylor has argued that independence, meaning freedom from 
“domination by a landlord or employer or slave-master,” was the key to 
understanding republican citizenship. If a man depended on others eco-
nomically, his attitudes and ideas could not truly be his own, which pre-
vented him from being a citizen in the truest sense of the word. In the 
crisis of 1794, the struggle over land was a struggle for economic inde-
pendence: settlers desired enough land to secure financial freedom for 
themselves and their families, speculators desired the freedom that could 
come with wielding great wealth in the new republic, and the Senecas 
desired enough land to stake out their continued survival. In the years after 
1794, most of the players in this campaign experienced mixed fortunes in 
their attempts to profit from the state’s land sales.54
Of all of the major players in northwestern Pennsylvania in the summer 
of 1794, be they Indians, settlers, speculators, or politicians, Adlum had 
done the most to secure his independence. The crisis created an oppor-
tunity for him; he continued to work while squatters fled the region en 
masse and other surveyors sat in forts, waiting for hostilities to subside. 
By leveraging his special talents as a surveyor, boldly staking out the best 
lands for his patrons while shrewdly understanding and manipulating the 
backcountry’s inhabitants, Adlum did his part to ensure that “great men” 
would dominate the best lands in the region. Adlum’s unlikely triumph 
sheds light on the unintended consequences of Pennsylvania’s land poli-
cies, which theoretically protected settlers but ultimately secured the lion’s 
share of land for grasping grand speculators. His experience shows the 
power that surveyors could wield on the early American frontier by fun-
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neling the best lands into the hands of the wealthy or leaving them to hus-
tling frontiersmen. Surveyors’ competence could make or break speculative 
investments. 
In addition, because so much of Adlum’s success depended on his good 
relations with the local Senecas, his story also demonstrates the Iroquois’ 
ongoing influence in northwestern Pennsylvania and their ability to shape 
the region’s development in the years after they formally lost their lands. If 
Cornplanter and the Allegany Senecas had not feared squatters more than 
speculators, it is unlikely that they would have allowed Adlum to conduct 
his surveys. Pennsylvania’s legal regime certainly favored wealthy elites, but 
it took both Adlum and Cornplanter for speculators to forestall squatters 
along French Creek in the summer of 1794.55
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